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Abstract 
Much has been written on Michel Foucault’s reluctance to clearly delineate a research method, 
particularly with respect to genealogy (Harwood 2000; Meadmore, Hatcher, & McWilliam 2000; 
Tamboukou 1999).  Foucault (1994, p. 288) himself disliked prescription stating, “I take care not 
to dictate how things should be” and wrote provocatively to disrupt equilibrium and certainty, so 
that “all those who speak for others or to others” no longer know what to do.  It is doubtful, 
however, that Foucault ever intended for researchers to be stricken by that malaise to the point of 
being unwilling to make an intellectual commitment to methodological possibilities. Taking 
criticism of “Foucauldian” discourse analysis as a convenient point of departure to discuss the 
objectives of poststructural analyses of language, this paper develops what might be called a 
discursive analytic; a methodological plan to approach the analysis of discourses through the 
location of statements that function with constitutive effects. 
Keywords: Foucault, discourse analysis, qualitative research in education. 
 
Different horses for different courses… 
Discourse analysis is a flexible term.  What one is doing is greatly dependent on the 
epistemological framework being drawn upon. It appears that many scholars using discourse 
analysis within a Foucauldian framework have adopted a ‘Foucauldianistic’ reticence to declare 
method, fearful perhaps of the charge of being prescriptive. There are those again who make 
references to “doing” discourse analysis and because they loosely link their analysis to motifs of 
power and sporadically cite Foucault, there is an assumption that this too is “Foucauldian” 
discourse analysis. In any case, it is quite difficult to find coherent descriptions of how one might 
go about “Foucauldian” discourse analysis, but perhaps the difficulty in locating concise 
descriptions is because there is no such thing?  In this paper, the reasons why this might be so are 
discussed whilst the author engages with the awkward tension that arises when one attempts to 
do poststructural work using Foucault, while at the same time satisfying the conventions of 
academic writing and scholarship in education research.   
 Despite there being no model for discourse analysis qua Foucault, should one claim to be 
drawing on a Foucauldian framework there is a very real danger in one’s work being dismissed 
as unFoucauldian - if one doesn’t get it right.  But how can one get it wrong when there are 
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supposedly no rules to follow? This is an interesting but precarious dilemma that can have an 
exclusionary effect (see O'Farrell 2005). Foucauldian theory is perceived as inaccessible and 
dangerous, which deters some researchers from engaging with this form of analysis, particularly 
those in more practice-oriented fields. The neoliberal malaise currently affecting universities 
(Davies 2005), which privileges so-called “evidence-based” research methods and causes some 
to caution against using the “F” word,1 only compounds this problem.   
As an umbrella term for anything vaguely left of far-right, “postmodernism” has been the 
whipping boy of the conservative Right in the Australian “culture wars” for over the past decade.  
For example in June 2007, the then Minister of Sport and The Arts, George Brandis MP 
delivered a sermon to visiting members of the Council of the Humanities, Arts and Social 
Sciences (CHASS).  Brandis attributed the decline in esteem (and government sponsorship) of 
the arts, humanities and social sciences to “academic practitioners who have, in seeking to 
understand human society, blundered down blind alleyways and fallen prey to the worship of 
false gods” (Brandis, 2007, p. 32).  He continued to argue (to an affronted and rapidly 
diminishing audience) that in order to “recover their prestige” the humanities need to, 
…embrace the standards of objective, rigorous scholarship that were once among their 
glories; to  accept that critical inquiry is not well served when it is, whether admittedly or 
implicitly, regarded instrumentally, in service of some ideology or social philosophy, 
rather than as an end in itself… scholarship in the mainstream of the humanities has been 
degraded for the very reason that it was dominated by an instrumentalist method, to fit 
scholarly inquiry into an historical paradigm that the events of the late 20th century have 
utterly discredited. (Brandis 2007, p. 32) 
As a key field in the social sciences and the potential “engine-room of the economy” (Rudd 
2007), education has received a great deal of attention in the last few years in Australia.  So too 
has educational research and scholarship, albeit for all the wrong reasons. Here too 
postmodernism is to blame for a perceived decline in standards: 
Our thinking processes have been addled by postmodernism, with its insistence that 
nothing is better than anything else… The circuitous theories of French philosophers 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes arrived on our shores in the '70s 
and '80s to be widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. Soon they were being applied in 
even more half-baked form to teacher education and then to teaching in schools. The 
effect on young brains has been roughly the same as what would happen to an assembly 
line of Rolls-Royces if you poured glue into all the door locks… Two generations of 
experimented-upon young Australians have emerged unable to read, write and think with 
the skill and clarity they should have been able to assume would be theirs… Too often, 
under the postmodern influence, schooling has turned into a hatchery for baby airheads 
unable to think for themselves or communicate clearly… Whatever the original worth 
and intention of the movement, postmodernism, with its insistence that there are no such 
things as objective truths, knowledge or values, gave licence to far too many to take the 
easy way out. (Gare 2006, p. 29) 
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Not surprisingly the corrosive effect of such attacks, together with the vetoing of 
“postmodernist” Australian Research Council research grants by Federal Education Minister 
Brendon Nelson, have further deterred researchers in education from applying poststructural 
research methods.  The recent growth in the use of mixed-methods and quasi-experimental 
design to answer questions more suited to qualitative methods, points towards an attempt by 
some to add a measure of “science-cred” to interpretive research, although this is not a new 
phenomenon as anyone familiar with discourse analysis will know.  
Analysing “rigorously”  
A number of years ago, Taylor (2004) provided an analysis of education policy documents using 
Critical Discourse Analysis.
2
  In doing so, she argued that Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), 
is particularly appropriate for critical policy analysis because it allows a detailed 
investigation of the relationship of language to other social processes, and of how 
language works within power relations.  CDA provides a framework for a systematic 
analysis – researchers can go beyond speculation and demonstrate how policy texts work. 
(original emphasis, Taylor 2004, p. 436) 
In Taylor’s (2004) discussion, distinction is made between two approaches to discourse analysis.  
This is principally between CDA, which draws inferences from structural and linguistic features 
in texts, and discourse analysis said to be informed by the work of Foucault.  The difference 
between the former, which Taylor (2004, p. 435) describes as paying “close attention to the 
linguistic features of texts” and the latter, described as “those which do not”, is perhaps more 
complex than this (see discussion in Wetherall 2001, p. 391-393).  For a start, there are more 
than these two approaches to discourse analysis and other epistemological frameworks inform 
them (Wetherall, Taylor, & Yates 2001).  Indeed, the common thread between analyses in the 
latter group is not Foucault at all. More germane to these approaches is a poststructural 
sensibility born of a “theorising that rests upon complexity, uncertainty and doubt and upon a 
reflexivity about its own production and its claims to knowledge about the social” (Ball 1995, p. 
269).   
 The difference between CDA
3
 and poststructural theoretical approaches (using Foucault, 
Derrida and Lyotard among others) to discourse analysis may be found in the characteristic 
eschewing of claims to objectivity and truth by those in the latter tradition; for, as Edwards and 
Nicoll (2001, p. 105) point out , “the claim to truth can itself be seen as a powerful rhetorical 
practice.”  Additionally, Humes and Bryce (original emphasis, 2003, p. 180) speak to the 
poststructuralist respect for uncertainty and the influence of key thinkers such as Derrida when 
they argue that, “the search for clarity and simplicity of meaning is seen as illusory because there 
will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material under review.  To seek a 
definitive account is, thus, a misguided undertaking.”  As such, discourse analysis informed by 
Foucauldian or other poststructural theory endeavours to avoid the substitution of one ‘truth’ for 
another, recognising that “there can be no universal truths or absolute ethical positions [and 
hence]… belief in social scientific investigation as a detached, historical, utopian, truth-seeking 
process becomes difficult to sustain” (Wetherall 2001, p. 384).  
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 Whilst poststructural accounts of meaning in language assert the “death of the author” 
(Barthes 1977b) because the potential for multiple reader interpretation/s has been established 
(Humes & Bryce 2003), this does not result in relativism.  Nor licence “to take the easy way out” 
(Gare 2006, p. 29). Influenced by the key works of influential thinkers including Barthes 
(1977b), Lyotard (1984) and Derrida (Derrida 1967a; 1967b; 1982), as well as the inimitable 
Foucault, poststructuralists argue that “the process of analysis is always interpretive, always 
contingent, always a version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical 
standpoint” (Wetherall 2001, p. 384).  Understanding that meaning is an inherently unstable 
construct negotiated by and through the ‘cultural politics of the sign’ (Trifonas 2000, p. 275), 
methodologists from this tradition tend to discount the sovereignty of the author, destabilising 
the treasured relationship between signifier and signified (Peters 2004; Trifonas 2000), in the 
recognition that the reader has ultimate authority over interpretation and therefore meaning –  
not, in fact, the author.  
 Researchers drawing on Foucauldian ideas therefore do not speak of their research 
“findings”.  They tend to use less emphatic language, recognising that truth is contingent upon 
the subjectivity of the reader and the fickleness of language. They would recognise the futility of 
trying to mine a policy document for the writer’s intention (Graham 2007b), and would not seek 
to speak for the subject of analysis (see Graham 2007a, p. 14).  It is for this reason that those 
using discourse analysis with Foucault shy away from prescribing method, for no matter how 
standardised the process, the analysis of language by different people will seldom yield the same 
result. This is not seen as problematic for the aim of poststructural analysis is not to establish a 
final “truth” but to question the intelligibility of truth/s we have come to take for granted.   
 Although not “scientific” this approach can be a powerful analytical tool, particularly in an 
applied field such as education. Through the experience such analysis provides, it is possible to 
come to a different relationship with those truth/s which may enable researchers to think and see 
otherwise, to be able to imagine things being other than what they are, and to understand the 
abstract and concrete links that make them so. Ultimately, the value of poststructural work is 
intellectual and conceptual. The critical relationship to truth enabled through Foucauldian 
problematisation does not mean that there is no truth – it means that truth is always contingent 
and subject to scrutiny. Truth is no longer immutable and this opens the door to powerful 
possibilities for change. Ultimately, to be able to see truth as a kind of fiction, as something we 
busily construct around ourselves means that we can come to see “truth” as something less final; 
as something we can (re)make ‘little by little… [by] introducing modifications that are able if 
not to find solutions, at least to change the given terms of the problem’ (Foucault, 1994, p. 288).   
 Despite how poorly understood Foucault’s work has been (see O’Farrell, 2006), approaching 
truth as a “construction” does not result in relativism. Nor does the admission that truth is 
contingent leave us peddling mere “speculation”.  Words on a page, utterances, symbols and 
signs, statements: these are the start and end point for the poststructural discourse analyst.  If 
anything this is the most honest and ethical approach to the analysis of language for, as Barthes 
(1977a, p. 148) points out, “the unity of a text is not in its origin, it is in its destination”.  The 
acknowledgment of such contingency is a profoundly ethical standpoint and the reluctance to 
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prescribe method reflects, not that “anything goes,” but the characteristic reticence of those 
“doing” discourse analysis within a poststructural framework to make claims to truth through 
‘scientific’, ‘objective’, ‘precise’ methodologies.  This again is not restricted to Foucauldian 
work, as Edwards and Nicoll (emphasis added, 2001, p. 106) demonstrate this same caution in 
discussing methodological possibilities in rhetorical analysis:  
The different elements may be combined in a variety of ways to produce different types 
of analysis that focus on a particular range of practices and issues.  They are not part of a 
method to be applied, but resources in an interpretive art.  
A distinction between the prescription of scientific method and the development of 
methodological guidelines should perhaps be emphasized here.  The formulation of “method” 
has traditionally been attempted to standardize research activity and to assist in the 
generalization of results.  In the human and social sciences particularly, this has been done to 
lend “scientific” credibility to fields of study marred by the often perplexing inconsistency 
arising from human behaviour (Foucault, 1972). Such an objective, if the insights of the great 
“anti-theorists” of postmodernism (Thomas, 1997, p. 80) are to be respected, is an impossible 
ambition when it comes to the analysis of discourse and language, particularly with respect to a 
search for original meanings or personal agendas.  This does not mean that language cannot be 
analysed, or that one cannot develop methods to approach this task. It simply means that one has 
to be clear about objectives, limits and, most importantly, what one is doing. 
  “Doing” Poststructural Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis consistent with a Foucauldian notion of discourse does not seek to reveal the 
true meaning by what is said or not said (Foucault 1972).  Instead, when “doing” discourse 
analysis within a Foucauldian framework, one looks to statements not so much for what they say 
but what they do; that is, one question’s what the constitutive or political effects of saying this 
instead of that might be?  As Foucault (1972, p. 134) argues, ‘there is no subtext’.  The analyst’s 
job ‘does not consist therefore in rediscovering the unsaid whose place [the statement] occupies’ 
(p. 134).  Instead, Foucault (Ibid.) maintains that ‘everything is never said’ and that the task is to 
determine, in all the possible enunciations that could be made on a particular subject, why it is 
that certain statements emerged to the exclusion of all others and what function they serve.  
 Such an approach distinguishes itself by interrogating what Foucault (1980a, p. 237) 
describes as, “the discourses of true and false… the correlative formation of domains and 
objects… the verifiable, falsifiable discourses that bear on them, and … the effects in the real to 
which they are linked.”  The objective is to explicate statements that function to place a 
discursive frame around a particular position; that is, statements which coagulate and form 
rhetorical constructions that present a particular reading of social texts. Incidentally, this includes 
all forms of signification: movement, behaviour, performance, gestures, art, symbols, text and so 
on. Elsewhere (Graham 2007a), I put an earlier draft of this analytic to work using literary theory 
to demonstrate how the use of particular discursive techniques in the production of meaning 
present a particular view of the world and prepare the ground for the “practices that derive from 
them” (Foucault 1972, p. 139). Building on this work here, I outline three important ideas from 
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Foucault’s work – description, recognition and classification – as a guide for how one might 
approach poststructural discourse analysis using Foucault. 
1. Description 
In order for an object of discourse to be “produced”, it must first be definable in order to be 
locatable. Language is the tool through which people communicate ideas, and successful 
communication between individuals and especially groups of individuals relies on the definition 
and specification that language allows. In the English language, we have many words that all 
sound the same: e.g., Threw and through; and to, two and too. Placing these words differently 
can completely alter a sentence and the meaning of the exchange. Therefore, in written 
communication we depend on the spelling of these different words and the other words used 
alongside them to guide our understanding of what is being said. In oral communication we rely 
on context and our ability to comprehend. The more specific our language, the more accurate we 
can be in conveying and understanding meaning. That specification however, the words we use 
to describe things, is the mechanism through which we define and shape what Foucault often 
referred to as “objects of discourse”. Thus, the main aim of a Foucauldian approach to discourse 
analysis is to trace the relationship between words and things: how the words we use to 
conceptualise and communicate end up producing the very ‘things’ or objects of which we 
speak. It is my view based on a reading of Foucault that the foundational starting point of such 
an analysis would be to define and locate what he calls ‘statements’. 
Making a StatementFoucault defines the statement as “[t]he atom of discourse” 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 80) but avoids defining it through any of the models borrowed from 
grammar, logic or analysis (Foucault, 1972). Instead, Foucault extracts the statement from “the 
simple inscription of what is said” (Deleuze 1988, p. 15) describing it, not as a linguistic unit like 
the sentence, but as “a function” (Foucault 1972, p. 98).  The statement as ‘function’ can be 
theorised as a discursive junction-box in which words and things intersect and become invested 
with particular relations of power, resulting in an interpellative event (Althusser 1971; Butler 
1990) in which one can “recognize and isolate an act of formulation” (Foucault 1972, p. 93).  
Figure 1 below aptly illustrates how this can occur. 
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 The above postcard advertising entertainment for a local council day features three circles 
that each headline the time and name of two main attractions: The Hooley Dooleys at 11am and 
Marcia Hines at 2pm.  The third circle mentions “Local and Multicultural Acts”. At first glance 
this may not seem problematic. On stage throughout the day were performances by dance 
groups, numerous bands
4
 and performers, however, none of the bands were “flown in” for the 
event, which means that all of the bands were essentially “local”. The use of the word “local” is 
interesting in this case because one would assume it was being used to mark geographic identity 
(See Ibrahim, this issue). Placing the word “local” alongside “multicultural” (rather than, say, 
international) results in what Foucault calls an act of formulation; qualifying the third circle 
above as a “statement” appropriate for analysis. 
 In this example, the signifier “local” is acting as a euphemism for Anglo-Australian, 
naturalising the dominant group (see Graham & Slee 2008). Unfortunately, the signifier 
“multicultural” is assuming the use for which it is most often used in Australia: denoting “other 
culture”, “non-Australian” or “the people that live here who aren’t Australian” (or aren’t white). 
This statement effectively conjures the cultural/ethnic Other; identities that are obliquely referred 
to yet “everyone knows ‘who’ is being talked about” (Popkewitz & Lindblad 2000, p. 9). Anglo-
Australian culture is not generally being referred to when someone is talking about the 
“multicultural”. For example in 2005 during the time of the Cronulla race riots, newsreaders 
referred to “carloads of ethnics coming up from Melbourne to join the cause”. In Australia, 
people not of Anglo-Western European appearance are often referred to as “ethnics” however, in 
denying that “Anglo-European” is itself a form of ethnicity, a cultural Other is produced and 
stubbornly maintained (Graham & Slee, 2008). This is not simply a matter of media ignorance as 
the following excerpt from an interview with an Australian academic will show:  
Monash University's Centre for Population and Urban Research head, Bob Birrell, 











Figure 1: Formulating the cultural “Other”
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Melbourne's northern suburbs had a significant number of immigrants and people of 
Middle-Eastern descent but its ethnic enclaves were not as big as in Sydney's 
southwest. "In Sydney, especially, more affluent ethnics, and to a greater rate non-
ethnics, are moving out of those areas so the concentration grows," Dr Birrell said.  
(Masanauskas & Mickelburough 2005, p. 1) 
The effect of such discursive processes have been articulated more fully by McGrath (2008) who 
draws upon the discursive analytic described here to understand how a set of developmental 
scales used to program for and assess English language learners in Australian schools works to 
define “culturally competent” Australian citizens. McGrath augments this analytic using 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power to understand how the national ESL Scales then 
function to produce and locate “culturally in/competent” students requiring remediation and 
cure. She develops a conceptual framework to illustrate how discourses and practices historically 
embedded in a White Australia consciousness intersect to produce notions of what it means to be 
“Australian;” subsequently reaffirming the exclusionary logic set out by the dominant discourse. 
Such an approach to discourse analysis can lead one back to and through the discursive markers 
paving the journey from linguistic profiling to ocular and theoretic recognition. This involves 
tracing the pathways between words and things and the processes of validation involved. 
2. Recognition 
According to Foucault (1972, p. 100), the statement is a “special mode of existence” which 
enables “groups of signs to exist, and enables rules or forms to become manifest” (Foucault 
1972, p. 99).  Thus, in theorising the tactics related to the production of psychiatric “truth” and 
the development of a power/knowledge specific to the human sciences, Foucault (1972, p. 86-
87) looks,  
to describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, 
to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains 
that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated.   
In doing so, he notes that “psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its domain, of defining 
what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and therefore of making it manifest, 
nameable, and describable” (Foucault 1972, p. 46).  He maintains that the construction of 
categories and description of disorders (such as the evolving descriptions within the American 
Psychiatric Association’s manual DSM-IV-TR) serves to provide the human sciences with a 
locatable object of scrutiny (Foucault 1975). However, for an object to be locatable it must first 
be recognizable and that is the ‘enunciative function of statements’. 
 Judith Butler (original emphasis, 1997, p. 5) declares that, “[o]ne ‘exists’ not only by virtue 
of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable.” By this Butler (p. 2) refers not 
only to the act of being addressed or hailed, but to the simultaneous effect of a discourse which 
both “interpellates and constitutes a subject”. Identities and categories exist prior to the subject, 
in effect, Butler (1997) argues, we “become” when interpellated through the prior power of 
language; that is, when we are described, we can then be “recognized” and classified. For the 
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discourse analyst using Foucault, the first step in understanding how “things” have come to be as 
they are, is to trace the processes involved in their constitution. This involves, as discussed in the 
previous section, the need to identify statements or articulations within a field of regulation that 
may function with constitutive effects. In order to understand how “words” become “things” in a 
Foucauldian sense, such an analyst would examine specific bodies of knowledge which, in 
validating certain statements build a discourse that reaffirms not only that particular perception 
of phenomena and the way it is described, but also outlines the specific and technical expertise 
required to deal with it.  
3. Classification 
Inherent to the medical account of childhood misbehaviour are procedures that outline 
‘symptoms’ of neurological disorder and the processes by which such children can be identified 
and classified. The cultural description of a child’s behaviour as ‘impulsive’, ‘hyperactive’, or 
‘inattentive’ builds the case for a medical assessment through which the doctor completes a 14 
point checklist compiled using the diagnostic criteria for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), and 
compliant teachers and parents tick boxes on behavioural scales that indicate whether a child’s 
naughty behaviour is of “clinical significance”.  Professional “recognition” of particular 
idiosyncrasies ensures that the child’s behaviour is properly classified and therefore, that the 
child is referred to the appropriate “expert”.  Specialised treatment of the child’s disorder may 
then begin (see Graham 2007c).  The question is: how does one trace the myriad discursive 
pathways involved? 
 In discussing Foucault’s interest in the statement, Deleuze (1988, p. 8) points to the 
constitutive properties intrinsic to it by imparting that a “statement has a ‘discursive object’ 
which does not derive in any sense from a particular state of things, but stems from the statement 
itself”, for a “statement always defines itself by establishing a specific link with something else 
that lies on the same level as itself… almost inevitably, it is something foreign, something 
outside” (original emphasis, Deleuze 1988, p. 11).  Through the location and analysis of such 
statements, it becomes possible to isolate the “positivity” (Foucault 1972, p. 214) of a particular 
power/knowledge. Identifying and following discursive traces leads one back to the knowledge-
domain upon which the statement relies for its intelligibility, at the same time revealing other 
artifacts or statements from that particular discursive formation which together, work to sustain 
the field from which they originate.  In other words, mutually reinforcing discourses construct an 
associated field which: 
… is made up of all the formulations whose status the statement in question shares, 
among which it takes its place without regard to linear order, with which it will fade 
away, or with which, on the contrary, it will be valued, preserved, sacralized, and offered, 
as a possible object, to a future discourse. (Foucault, 1972, p. 110 -111) 
At this point I wish to return to my earlier discussion of the statement “Local and Multicultural 
Acts.”  It is only through self-reinforcing discursive processes such as those I outline above, that 
it becomes possible in a contemporary liberal society with anti-discrimination legislation to 
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discriminate, marginalize and exclude – and, for this to pass relatively unnoticed.  The validation 
of statements such as “Local and Multicultural Acts” through a wider cultural discourse that 
speaks of ethnicity as something Other, not only produces recognizable and racialised “ethnics” 
but ensures their classification and exclusion even more emphatically through what is arguably a 
contradiction in terms: non-ethnics. The term “non-ethnic” valorizes white Anglo-Australians as 
members of a natural order; further marginalizing citizens of non-Anglo European descent.
5
  In 
this way, discourse analysis using Foucault can help us to understand how, as Leonardo (in 
press, this issue) describes, “[r]acial hailing still occurs” and, perhaps more importantly, why 
“many of its subjects still turn around when their subjectivity is called upon to answer”.  
Discourse analysts drawing upon Foucault understand that discourse produces subjects as well as 
objects and key to understanding people’s actions is an appreciation of how discourse shapes 
their identities, beliefs, actions (see Graham 2009). 
Foucault’s theorisation of the constitutive and disciplinary properties of discursive 
practices within socio-political relations of power is a demonstration of the postmodern concern 
with how language works to not only produce meaning, but also particular kinds of objects and 
subjects upon whom and through which particular relations of power are realised. Unlike 
Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA (Fairclough 2003; van Dijk 2001), discourse analysis using 
Foucault focuses less on the micro - the structural/grammatical/linguistic/semiotic features that 
make up the text - and more on the macro (Threadgold 2003); that is, what is “made up” by the 
text itself. 
The aim of this form of analysis is to “try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a 
constitution of subjects” (Foucault 1980b, p. 97) through the interrogation of discursive practices 
that both objectify and subjugate the individual. Objectification acts as a locating device; a 
mechanism of visibility (Deleuze 1992; Ewald 1992) that formulates how a “group is seen or 
known as a problem” (Scheurich 1997, p. 107). Once constituted as an object of a particular sort, 
individuals can be dispersed into disciplinary spaces within that “grid of social regularity” 
(Scheurich, 1997, p. 98) and from there, can become subject to particular discourses and 
practices that result in what Butler (1997, p. 358-359) describes as, “the ‘on-going’ subjugation 
that is the very operation of interpellation, that (continually repeated) action of discourse by 
which subjects are formed in subjugation.”  In other words through the process of objectification, 
individuals not only come to occupy spaces in the social hierarchy but, through their continual 
subjugation, come to know and accept their place. 
 
Conclusion 
Stephen Ball (1995, p. 267) reminds us that “the point about theory is not that it is simply 
critical” and that theory in educational research should be “to engage in struggle, to reveal and 
undermine what is most invisible and insidious in prevailing practices.”  Poststructural discourse 
analysis that draws on the work of Foucault is well placed to do this.  In looking to the function 
of statements in discourses that work to (re)secure dominant relations of power (Nakayama & 
Krizek 1995) and the correlative formation of domains and objects (Deleuze 1988; Dreyfus & 
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Rabinow 1982; Foucault 1972), the poststructural discourse analyst certainly shares the Critical 
Discourse Analyst’s concern as to the “relationship of language to other social processes, and of 
how language works within power relations” (Taylor 2004, p. 436). While these two approaches 
may offer different analyses, this simply confirms the assertion that “there will always be other 
perspectives from which to interpret the material under review” (Humes & Bryce 2003, p. 180) 
and the kaleidoscopic nature of language and meaning; certainly not that one analyses is any 
more ‘true’ than the other.   
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1
 Here I am referring to the practice where Foucauldian notions are used but reference to Foucault is deliberately 
stricken from the reference list.  It happens, and whilst it is described as “strategy” it really should be described as 
self-censorship. 
2
 I use capitals here to denote CDA because arguably both approaches to discourse analysis are critical. 
3
 Just to complicate matters, Fairclough himself maintains that CDA is informed by the work of Foucault.  The 
question for scholars then becomes:  Is CDA appropriately Foucauldian (and does it want to be?) or is CDA 
somehow set apart from Foucauldian discourse analysis?  And, if so, how and does this negate its resonance with 
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Foucault?  Any definitive claim to “research findings” or similar claim to truth would not sit well with Foucauldian 
ideas. 
4
 The significance of the naming of “local and multicultural acts” first became apparent when watching a band play 
Brazilian music with carnivale dancers. These performers represented “multicultural acts”. 
5
 Born in Zimbabwe to Scots/Irish parents and raised in Dublin before emigrating to Australia in the 1980s, this 
author identifies as Celtic-Australian, not Anglo. However as an immigrant of white European appearance, I have 
noticed that my nationality is assumed to be “Australian” whereas this is rarely the case with new Australians of a 
darker skin tone. This realisation came home powerfully the night Sydney’s bid to win the Olympics was announced 
as successful. One in a group of young men called out “Bad luck Beijing!” to a man standing close by, who 
cheerfully replied, “No worries mate, it’s all good”. The exchange stopped the young men in their tracks as this man 
had a broader Australian accent than they did. It turned out that he was 5th generation Chinese-Australian. His 
ancestors had come to Australia during the Gold Rush in the 1800s and his claim to “Australian” heritage turned out 
to have deeper roots than either myself or any of the young men who had taunted him as a representative of 
“Beijing”. 
